

Faculty of Computer Science, Operating Systems Group

The L4 ecosystem

Berlin, Dec 2004



System Issues

- Convential systems are
 - Complex
 - Linux kernel at least 500,000 LoC
 - Prone to errors
 - Drivers
 - All system components run in privileged mode
 - Inflexible
 - Global policies
 - Large Trusted Computing Base (TCB)



Insights

Observation:

Most kernel functionality does not need CPU privileges, like:

- Filesystems
- Driver functionality
- User management



What is really needed

Jochen Liedtke: "A microkernel does no real work"

- ⇒ Kernel provides only inevitable mechanisms
- ⇒ No policies enforced by the kernel

What is inevitable?

Abstractions	Mechanisms
Threads	 Communication
	 Scheduling
 Address Spaces 	Safe construction

⇒ This should be sufficient for everything



The Marred Perception of Microkernels

- Supposed to be slow
 - Not true any more
- No obvious benefit
 - Infamous dispute Torvalds vs. Tannenbaum
 - How much worth is manageability of complexity?
- GNU Hurd
 - Late
 - Slow
 - Constantly lagging behind other OS in functionality



The Case for Microkernels

- Complexity needs to be handled
 - Structure beyond monolithic kernels are needed
 - Several candidates
 - Virtualisation
 - Paravirtualisation
 - Microkernel
- Implementation of some functionality is even simplified
 - Real time
 - DROPS
 - RTLinux
 - Security
 - Substantially smaller trusted computing base



Agenda

- Introduction
- Agenda
- L4 µ-kernels
- Legacy support
- Security




The Rise and Demise of the First Microkernel

- First interest in mid-eighties
- Mach
 - Started with stripped down UNIX kernels
 - High level abstractions
 - Asynchronous messages
 - Ports
 - Virtual memory management
 - Adopted by IBM for future OS development
 - Disastrous results
 - None of the ambitious goals achieved
 - The idea seemed to be a failure
- **BUT**: still alive in MacOS X



Mac OS X

- Mac OS X Kernel (Darwin) based on Mach/BSD
- Drivers / BSD services run in kernel mode





Getting it Right the 2nd Time

• Jochen Liedtke published ground-breaking results in the mid-90ies


- Bottom-up approach
 - Mach started with a UNIX kernel
- Kernel provides only minimal functionality
 - Address spaces with threads
 - Inter-Process Communication (IPC)
 - Hierarchical memory management
- Under active development
 - V.2, X.0, X.2
 - 9 supported architectures (L4Ka::Pistachio)
 - Alpha, ARM, IA32, AMD64, IA64, Mips64, PPC32, PPC64, SPARCv9



Threads

Abstraction and unit of execution


- Identified by thread id
- Consists of
 - Instruction pointer
 - Stack
 - Registers, flags, ...
 - ⇒ Thread state
- L4 only manages (preserves) IP, SP and registers
- Entry point, stack allocation (size, location) and memory is managed by user-level applications






Page Mapping

- Entry in virtual memory points to page frame in phys. memory
- ⇒ Map creates an entry in the receiver's address space pointing to the same page frame
- ⇒ Only valid entries in pager's address space can be mapped to clients






L4 Hierarchical Memory Management





Page-Fault Handling


- Communication with pager thread ⇒ IPC
- ⇒ Kernel page-fault handler sets up IPC to pager
- Pager sees faulting thread as sender of IPC





Page-Fault Resolution

Pager maps pages of his own address space to the address space of the client






The Fiasco µ-kernel

- Started by Michael Hohmuth in 1997
 - no free L4 implementation was available
 - Kernel for TUD OS projects
- Uses lock- and wait-free synchronization to be fully preemptible
 - → Prerequisite for Real-Time
- Written in C++
- Available for x86 and ARM
 - AMD64 to come




Fiasco-UX

- Port of Fiasco to Linux
 - similar to UML
- Easy test and development
 - No test hardware required
- Supports other L4 projects
 - DoPE, the L4 native GUI
 - L⁴Linux





Building systems with L4 – system design





System Core Services

- µ-kernel alone doesn't do much
- Need several basic services
 - Initial task
 - Name server
 - Memory management
 - Loader
 - File provider
- Programming support libraries
 - libc
 - Thread handling
 - Synchronization
 - ...

This basic functionality is called L4 environment, **L4Env**, and provides a higher-level abstraction of the kernel API.




Linux on L4

- A port of the Linux kernel to L4
- Support legacy operating systems on L4
 - Binary compatible with Linux applications
 - Runs standard distributions
- Started in 1996 with Linux 2.0
- Latest: 2.6, based on L4Env




L⁴Linux

- Linux kernel runs in an L4 tasks
- The Architecture-dependent part uses L4 primitives
 - Threads
 - Mappings
 - IRQ IPC





System Call Handling



- On x86, the kernel is entered for system calls via "int 0x80"
- On L4, this will result in an exception
- Exceptions are delivered as an IPC to the exception handler




DROPS, the Dresden Realtime OPerating System

- Allow the coexistence of real-time and non-real-time applications
 - Common property of current applications, e.g. multimedia
 - Requires proper resource management
- Provide real-time guarantees using standard hardware
 - Build real-time systems using standard PC and network hardware
 - ⇒ Make behavior predictable




DROPS - Architecture



Fiasco Microkernel



DROPS – Real-Time Application Model




- Applications are constructed from several real-time components
 - Application sets up and controls chain of components
 - Components process data streams
 - Data transfer between components e.g. using DSI



Imprecise Computations

- Idea:
 - Split application in mandatory and optional part
 - Mandatory part computes necessary result
 - Optional part improves the result




- Example: Radar target tracking
 - Results of mandatory part exact enough to be able to follow target
 - Optional part improves accuracy of coordinates



DROPS: Quality-Assuring Scheduling

- Combines several ideas
 - Reservation-based scheduling
 - Splitting of applications into several parts (imprecise scheduling)
 - Probabilistic guarantees of deadlines (stochastic rate monotonic scheduling)
 - Guarantee that a requested percentage of the optional parts reach their deadline
- Application Model
 - Periodic
 - Split into one mandatory and at least one optional part
 - Execution times are described by distributions





Nizza – Security Principles

- Minimal Trusted Computing Base (TCB) per application / service
 - Small security kernel microkernel
 - Small set of small compontents (servers, ...)
 - Well-defined interfaces
 - Application-specific selection of platform components
- Split applications / services
 - Sensitive part on trusted platform
 - Less-sensitive (convenient) part of legacy OS



Nizza – Security Objectives

Confidentiality No unauthorized access to information
Integrity No unauthorized, unnoticed modification of information
Recoverability No permanent damage of information
Availability Timeliness of service



Nizza – System Security Objectives

- Secure and unsecure applications (trusted vs. untrusted)
 - Secure / trusted booting
 - Trusted path from/to user Secure Graphical User Interface
 - Protection against Trojan Horses
 - Storage of sensitive information
 - Cryptographic keys, personal data
- Compatibility
 - Legacy applications / Operation systems
 - Standard hardware plus up-to-date enhancements (e.g. TPM)
 - User-friendliness




Nizza - Features

- Fine-grained isolation between applications
- Minimal TCB for trusted applications / services Reuse of untrusted components via **Trusted Wrappers**
 - Sandboxing
 - Perimeter Wrapping
- Support for trusted computing hardware
- Open Source alternative to Microsoft NGSCB



The NIZZA Security Architecture






µsina - Secure Microkernel-based System Architecture

- Build an IPsec VPN gateway with microkernel technology
- Reduce complexity of underlying platform (TCB)
- Run security sensitive components separately
 - (Re-)Use other software for untrusted parts
- Viaduct: IPsec component for en-/decryption
- Encrypted and unencrypted traffic are handled by different L⁴Linux instances



µsina - Secure Microkernel-based System Architecture





Future

- Embedded systems
- Virtualization
- Advanced kernel features
 - communication control
 - kernel memory management



L4 Related Projects

- Mungi
- DD/OS
- NomadBIOS
- L4Hurd



Q/A?

http://os.inf.tu-dresden.de/
http://os.inf.tu-dresden.de/fiasco/
http://os.inf.tu-dresden.de/fiasco/ux/
http://os.inf.tu-dresden.de/L4/
http://os.inf.tu-dresden.de/drops/
http://os.inf.tu-dresden.de/L4/LinuxOnL4/

http://l4linux.org/

http://l4ka.org/